Future of UK Aid and Development Assistance
- Riya Mohan
- Dec 4, 2025
- 7 min read
Call for Evidence by Riya Mohan
Published by the UK Parliament's International Development Committee

About the ACAA
Founded by Dr Nooralhaq Nasimi MBE, a former refugee from Afghanistan, ACAA is a UK-based charity supporting refugees and migrants to integrate and thrive in the UK. We work with individuals from over 35 countries, providing advice, training and community programmes that promote inclusion and opportunity. Since 2014, ACAA has also delivered humanitarian and development projects inside Afghanistan, including the establishment of the country’s first free, community-based Citizens Advice Centres in Kabul and Baghlan with support from UK Aid Direct. The project, employing 8 staff and 30 local volunteers, achieved an A++ rating for impact, value for money and innovation. Following the 2021 Taliban takeover, ACAA’s in-country operations had to be suspended, though humanitarian assistance continues where possible. ACAA is the recipient of the Queen’s Award for Voluntary Service, and Dr Nasimi has been honoured with both an MBE, a British Citizens Award, and an Honorary Doctorate from Royal Holloway, University of London.
Executive Summary
In February 2025, the UK Government announced that it will be reducing UK aid spending to 0.3% from its original commitment of 0.7% of gross national income (GNI). This reduction would mean aid to amount to a total of £9.2 billion, the lowest in cash terms since 2012. ACAA welcomes the opportunity to provide evidence in relation to this inquiry on the future of UK aid and development assistance. We focus this submission specifically on the context of Afghanistan, where aid is both a moral responsibility and a strategic necessity for the UK.
We address three key inquiry questions:
1. How should the Government be prioritising UK Official Development Assistance (ODA)?
2. How should the Government communicate the results of UK aid and its importance to the public?
3. How can the UK’s approach to development be sufficiently flexible to respond to what its partners need most?
Q1. How should the Government be prioritising UK Official Development Assistance (ODA)?
Afghanistan remains one of the world’s poorest and most fragile countries, yet it is absent from recent UK aid plans and public statements[1]. The FCDO’s latest figures show aid to Africa falling by £184 million, while support to Europe, the Indo-Pacific, Nigeria, and the British Overseas Territories increasing. However, there is no clarity on where Afghanistan fits within the UK’s development priorities. This omission is deeply concerning and risks undermining two decades of UK engagement and investment.
Key concerns and recommendations:
1. Poverty data and metrics: The Government’s Plan for Change[2] emphasises reducing “global poverty” through international aid, a goal the ACAA strongly supports. However, when such broad terms guide funding decisions, there is a risk that countries like Afghanistan are overlooked. Poverty as a metric often gets lost in fragile contexts like Afghanistan where data collection is difficult. Since the Taliban takeover in 2021, no official poverty surveys have been conducted. However, recent analysis by UNICEF Afghanistan and the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) found that 62.3% of Afghans live in multidimensional poverty, experiencing multiple deprivations across health, education, and living standards[3]. These indicators demonstrate that Afghanistan should be central to any strategy focused on global poverty reduction. The Centre for Global Development[4] has also identified Afghanistan among 12 countries that are significantly under-supported by major donors and should be prioritised in future allocations amidst funding cuts.
2. Funding gap: Following the US funding freeze, the United States, previously Afghanistan’s largest bilateral donor, can no longer offer international aid. As Afghanistan’s historic partner and the second major donor, the UK need to step up to cover the shortfall and preserve hard-won development gains.
3. Closure of legal routes: The closure of the ARAP and ACRS resettlement schemes has stranded thousands of Afghans who worked alongside British forces. Maintaining a visible in-country aid presence becomes even more essential at this time.
We recommend that Afghanistan is explicitly included in the FCDO’s priority country framework, with transparent, published figures on planned and actual UK aid allocations, a clear strategy balancing humanitarian relief with long-term system resilience, and commitment to protecting the rights and welfare of women and girls, who remain disproportionately affected by Afghanistan’s current crisis.
Q2. How should the Government be communicating the results of UK aid, and its importance, to the public? What is needed to facilitate this?
The 2020 DfID-FCO merger into the FCDO that aimed to integrate diplomacy has in reality eroded development expertise, reducing transparency, and confusing the UK’s aid identity. Independent reviews[5] note that this has made it harder to demonstrate results and maintain public trust.
Key concerns and recommendations:
1. Lack of transparency: The reasons behind repeated aid budget cuts, from 0.7% to 0.5% and now towards 0.3% of GNI, have never been clearly explained. Baroness Jenny Chapman, the new Development Minister, recently stated that “anyone who wants us to have a serious budget in the future knows that we have to rebuild public support”[6] and yet, evidence shows that public support for aid was stable (44 - 46%) before the cuts and actually rose to 53% afterwards, indicating that public opinion was not the main reason for the reductions[7]. If the Government seeks to align aid policy with taxpayer expectations, it needs to strengthen transparency and communication around how and why such decisions are made.
2. Communication gaps: Currently, the UK Government communicates aid outcomes primarily through statistical summaries (FCDO Annual Reports, the Development Tracker) and limited case studies. This approach, while compliant, is overly technical and detached from real human impact. Qualitative feedback from ACAA’s own beneficiaries, particularly Afghan refugees in the UK, indicates that many are unaware of the support the FCDO provides inside Afghanistan. This is largely because there is little accessible, visual, or engaging communication about international aid where it matters most: to affected communities and the British public alike. We recommend that aid communication shifts from statistical to human-focused storytelling, highlighting tangible impact and lived experience. The FCDO must also collaborate more closely with civil society, diaspora organisations, and implementing partners to share narratives from communities.
Q3. How can the UK’s approach to development be sufficiently flexible to respond to what its partners need most?
The Minister for International Development has outlined four essential shifts in UK aid delivery – from donor to investor, from service delivery to system support, from grants to expertise, and from international intervention to local provision.
Key concerns and recommendations:
1. Evidence gap: There is limited publicly available evidence on the effectiveness of the UK’s new investment-led development approach, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected states. The ACAA recommends that the FCDO publish evaluations and lessons from pilot initiatives before scaling or institutionalising this shift. Transparent evidence will help ensure that aid remains effective, context-sensitive, and aligned with both humanitarian imperatives and the UK’s development objectives.
2. Homogenising need: While these shifts reflect innovation and ambition, which ACAA welcomes, they also risk applying a one-size-fits-all model that overlooks the unique political, economic, and social realities of fragile states. The proposed shift from donor to investor represents a strategic reorientation of development policy, from direct grant-based assistance toward partnership-driven financing that mobilises private capital. However, its success depends on a country’s political stability, institutional capacity, and investment readiness. While such an approach may stimulate growth and reduce long-term aid dependency in stable, emerging markets, it remains far less feasible in fragile or conflict-affected states like Afghanistan — where weak governance, insecurity, and the absence of reliable financial systems prevent private sector engagement.
See Appendix A below for how this shift varies in feasibility across different country contexts, highlighting where the investor model could work, and where continued reliance on traditional, grant-based aid remains essential to meeting humanitarian and development needs.
Conclusion and Call to Action:
Dr Nooralhaq Nasimi MBE HonDSS (RHUL), Founder and Director Key of the ACAA, says: “The UK has played a vital role in supporting Afghan communities, and the positive impact of this longstanding partnership is clear. As Afghanistan faces profound humanitarian and economic challenges, it is crucial that the UK reaffirms a long-term, transparent, and realistic commitment to the country. Ensuring Afghanistan is reintegrated into future UK aid planning is essential to preventing the loss of past progress and to safeguarding the wellbeing of the most vulnerable.”
Darius Nasimi, Head of Funding and Partnerships at the ACAA, emphasises: “For more than a decade, UK support has enabled organisations like ours to deliver life-changing assistance to Afghans. Yet today, despite one of the world’s deepest humanitarian crises, Afghanistan has nearly disappeared from the UK’s aid strategy. Diaspora-led organisations remain ready to ensure aid is targeted and grounded in local realities. We urge the Committee to bring Afghanistan back to the centre of UK development planning — the human cost of inaction is simply too great.”
UK ODA: Donor to Investor Feasibility by Country Context
Country Context | Model Most Suitable | Feasibility | Policy Challenges | Equality Considerations |
Stable, Lower‑Middle‑Income Economies with Reform Momentum | Investor Partnership Model – blended finance, private sector mobilisation | Good governance, growing private sector, predictable regulatory frameworks | Blended finance can mobilise private capital but may still benefit elites; ensuring additionality is key | Must integrate gender‑equality, marginalised groups inclusion; ensure women/girls at heart of investment focus |
Emerging Markets with Expanding Consumer Base | Hybrid Model – investment + capacity building (digital, trade, private sector) | Large markets, scale potential, UK trade/development linkages | Risk that UK ODA becomes commercialised rather than development‑driven; measurement of impact and value‑for‑money crucial | Equity risk: rapid growth may exclude rural/poor, women, ethnic minorities; metrics must capture inclusion |
Small Island/Vulnerable Economies | Resilience Investment Model – climate finance, disaster resilience, green bonds | Smaller markets but high vulnerability, opportunity for UK expertise | Challenges: small scale, high cost‑per‑beneficiary, risk of debt burden; need tailored instruments | Vulnerable populations (women, indigenous groups) especially impacted by climate; must embed local leadership |
Fragile and Conflict‑Affected States (FCAS) | Traditional Donor Model – grants, humanitarian aid, service delivery, partial system-reform | Weak institutions, high risk, low private sector attractiveness | Investment models difficult to be implemented in fragile states; risk of aid dependency and weak sustainability | Women/girls and marginalised groups disproportionately affected; humanitarian access and protection essential |
Transitioning or Post‑Conflict Economies | Sequenced Model – systems support + gradual investment introduction | Reform momentum and institutional strengthening open pathways | Sequencing and timing are critical; monitoring and local ownership matter | Inclusion of formerly excluded groups, women’s leadership, local capacity building must be emphasised |
REFERENCES
[1] House of Commons Library (2024) UK aid: trends and debates. Research Briefing CBP-10243. Available at: https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10243/.
[2] GOV.UK (2025) Our missions – Plan for change. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/missions
[3] UNICEF Afghanistan (2025) Afghanistan adjusted Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) 2023. Available at: https://www.unicef.org/afghanistan/documents/afghanistan-mpi-report
[4] Center for Global Development (2025) As the UK’s Aid Cuts Begin, Which Countries Should the FCDO Protect? Available at: https://www.cgdev.org/blog/uks-aid-cuts-begin-which-countries-should-fcdo-protect
[5] Publish What You Fund (2025) UK aid transparency has improved, but the Home Office is not transparent about its ODA spending. Available at: https://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/2025/10/uk-aid-transparency-has-improved-but-the-home-office-is-not-transparent-about-its-oda-spending/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
[6] Bond (2025) Let’s get real about public support for UK aid and development. Available at: https://www.bond.org.uk/news/2025/06/lets-get-real-about-public-support-for-uk-aid-and-development/
[7] Development Engagement Lab (2024) UK public support for foreign aid in face of the 0.7 cut. Available at: https://developmentengagementlab.org/uk-public-support-foreign-aid-in-face-of-0-7-cut/