‘One In, One Out’: Have Britain and France Signed a Fractured Deal?

Op-ed, by Riya Mohan

French President Emmanuel Macron’s three-day visit to the UK saw a grand ceremonial carriage procession to Windsor Castle, a state banquet, address to the Parliament, and academic and cultural visits. However, the 10^th of July joint press conference was the defining moment, with British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Macron standing side by side to announce the “One In, One Out” deal – a statement that dropped like a stone into the Channel, sending ripples across Britain.

More than 50,000 irregular migrants have arrived to the UK via small boats, since Starmer pledged to “smash the gangs” and dismantle their business model. In 2025 alone, Britain saw over 25,000 migrants arrive via the English Channel. This number continues to rise and the Channel crossing show no signs of slowing down. The ‘One In, One Out’ returns deal, Starmer and Macron hope, will be the holy grail. But will it deliver?

The deal dictates that for every undocumented migrant returned to France, Britain will accept an equal number of asylum seekers stranded there who have family ties to the UK or a legitimate claim to protection. The Home Office also announced that it will be backing up the deal with a “hard-hitting campaign”, warning future migrants in Northern France and beyond not to risk their money and life making dangerous small boat journeys to the UK.

At the outset, this migration policy looks eerily similar to the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement instated to deter irregular migration from Turkey to Greece. The statement of cooperation rested on a simple calculation: anyone arriving illegally in Greece through the Aegean Sea would be sent back to Turkey, and for every return, the EU would accept one Syrian refugee from Turkey. On paper, the pact worked as smugglers lost their grip on the Aegean route and arrivals to Greece dropped by 90%.

However, despite fewer asylum-seekers entering Greece, their numbers inside the country rose sharply – a crack in the façade that exposed the deal’s flaws. Legally, deportations became difficult as Turkey consistently did not meet the standards of a “safe third country”. Meanwhile, Greece’s underfunded asylum system collapsed under the weight of the demand it was never built to handle. For the asylum seekers stuck inside Greece, conditions were even worse. Stuck in limbo for years until their claims were processed, they were trapped in reception centres on the Greek islands. They could neither be deported, nor allowed movement to the mainland or elsewhere in Europe. Greece, once a transit country, became a containment zone – ready to explode. Detention centres and refugee camps like Moria became associated with squalid conditions, overflown toilets, filthy mattresses, and human misery.

If Britain and France are retracing old footsteps, will this new route to deterrence work?

Firstly, for 25,000 migrants who arrived in a single year, a return of 2,600 yearly is too small a number for “getting a grip on illegal immigration”. And yet, as Starmer puts it, “No short cuts, no gimmicks” is this government’s defining mantra. Critics however disagree, with Alexander Wilson, Reform UK London Assembly Member calling the deal a “gimmick”.

Secondly, Mediterranean countries or the Med 5 (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, and Spain) have already expressed concerns to the European Commission about the deal being negotiated outside of EU framework. Since EU law requires asylum seekers to apply in their first country of entry, which is often one of the Med 5, they fear that migrants rejected by the UK would ultimately be transferred south. Ensuring that migrants do not end up inside EU member states is important to head off potential political roadblocks, or else ‘One In, One Out’ risks being another fractured deal.

Thirdly, smugglers thrive on policies that tighten migration control. They capitalise on misery, raise their prices and diversify services to keep their business running. Such a deal in that case, only risks diverting irregular migrants through other riskier routes.

In reality, deterrence could work if Britain opens safe and legal routes to asylum-seekers in need of protection – fleeing war, persecution, conflict, and human rights violations. Introducing these routes is the only way to reduce demand for unsafe Channel crossings. Yet the UK government has done the opposite. Instead of expanding these routes, it has recently closed down both of its Afghan schemes, ARAP and ACRS, effectively shutting the door on those who fought alongside British forces or who remain at serious risk under Taliban rule.

Migrants are determined to cross the Channel no matter what obstacles are put in place. Media footage from France shows French police entering makeshift camps and shallow waters, slashing the ‘taxi-boats’ using knives. But the reality is that French policy of ‘zero fixation points’ to disorganise migrants and disrupt their plans isn’t actually working. By the time migrants reach France, they have already undertaken perilous journeys and risked everything. France is the last leg in the journey, while Britain the ultimate destination.

Whether the ‘One In, One Out’ policy creates enough deterrence to those wanting to overcome the last hurdle in their crossing remains to be seen.